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Abstract 
John Locke accepts that every perception gives me immediate and intuitive knowledge of my 
own existence. However, this knowledge is limited to the present moment when I have the 
perception. If I want to understand the necessary and sufficient conditions of my continued 
existence over time, Locke argues that it is important to clarify what ‘I’ refers to. While we often 
do not distinguish the concept of a person from that of a human being in ordinary language, 
Locke emphasizes that this distinction is important if we want to engage with questions of 
identity over time. According to Locke, persons are thinking intelligent beings who can consider 
themselves as extended into the past and future and who are concerned for their happiness and 
accountable for their actions. Moreover, for Locke a self is a person, considered from a first-
personal point of view. I show that the concept of self that he develops in the context of his 
discussion of persons and personal identity is richer and more complex than the I-concept that 
he invokes in his version of the cogito. I further argue that Locke’s moral and religious views 
explain why he emphasizes the need for a conceptual distinction between persons and human 
beings. In the final section I turn to the reception of Locke’s view by some of his early critics 
and defenders, including Elizabeth Berkeley Burnet, an anonymous author, and Catharine 
Trotter Cockburn.  
 
 
 
1. Ideas, perception, and knowledge of my own existence 
 
John Locke (1632–1704) in his Essay concerning Human Understanding1 approaches philosophy 
through a careful study of the human mind. He is interested in understanding how the mind first 
acquires content, namely ideas, how perception operates, and how simple ideas form the 
building blocks of more complex ideas, and how they generate belief and knowledge when ideas 
are arranged in propositional form. Locke commonly uses the term ‘perception’ in a broad sense 
interchangeably with thinking to include not just sense-perception but all types of mental 
operations. In the following I will adopt this broad usage.  
																																																						
1 References to the Essay are to John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P. H. 
Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975 [1690]), hereafter cited in the text as “Essay” followed 
by book, chapter, and section number. 
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Perception for Locke involves ideas, because when I perceive, I perceive something and 
Locke calls the intentional object of perception an idea (see Essay I.i.8). Locke argues that there 
is no question that we have ideas, because “every one is conscious of them in himself, and Men’s 
Words and Actions will satisfy him, that they are in others.” (Essay I.i.8) Although initially ideas 
will be acquired through sensation and represent things external to the mind, we can also look 
into our own mind and observe the mind’s operation (see Essay II.i.1–4). Locke calls this latter 
process reflection. Reflection makes it possible to acquire ideas about the mind’s own operations 
such as the ideas of perceiving, doubting, reasoning, remembering, imagining, or believing (see 
Essay II.i.4).  
Moreover, for Locke all perception or thinking is conscious (see Essay II.i.10, 19, 
II.xxvii.9). He claims that “thinking consists in being conscious that one thinks” (Essay II.i.19) 
and that “[i]t being impossible for any one to perceive, without perceiving, that he does 
perceive” (Essay II.xxvii.9). Although he has sometimes been interpreted as equating 
consciousness with reflection,2 this reading is problematic, because Locke would either have to 
accept that his view leads to an infinite regress, or he has to give up his claim that it is impossible 
“to perceive without perceiving, that he does perceive.” Reflection is a higher order state about 
another perceptual state and this creates a gap between the initial perception and the reflection 
about it. The regress problem vanishes, if rather than regarding consciousness as a separate 
mental state in addition to the perception, consciousness is considered to be an inherent part of 
every perception. On these grounds, several Locke scholars have argued convincingly that such a 
same order reading is more plausible and to be preferred.3 The proposal is that consciousness 
can be understood as an “inherent reflexivity”4 that is part of every perception.  
Given Locke’s understanding of ideas, perception, and consciousness, it is worth asking 
what Locke has to say about the perceiver, or the subject that is having the perception. One 
place where engages with this question is in Book IV of the Essay, where he offers his version of 
the cogito and maintains that every act of perception gives me intuitive knowledge of my own 
existence.5 He writes: 
 
																																																						
2 For instance, Leibniz reads Locke in this way and objects that Locke’s understanding of 
consciousness leads to an infinite regress. See Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, New Essays on Human 
Understanding, ed. Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), II.i.19, 118. See also Thomas Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of Man, ed. 
Knud Haakonssen and James A. Harris (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010 [1788]), 
I.3, 21–22; Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, ed. Derek R. Brookes (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2002 [1785]), I.5, 58, III.5, 268–269, VI.1, 421. 
3 More detailed support for same order interpretations can be found in Angela Coventry and 
Uriah Kriegel, "Locke on Consciousness," History of Philosophy Quarterly 25 (2008); Philippe 
Hamou, "Locke and Descartes on Selves and Thinking Substances," in Locke and Cartesian 
Philosophy, ed. Philippe Hamou and Martine Pécharman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 
121–124; Udo Thiel, The Early Modern Subject: Self-Consciousness and Personal Identity from Descartes to 
Hume (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 111–118; Shelley Weinberg, Consciousness in Locke 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), ch. 2. 
4 Thiel, The Early Modern Subject, 116. 
5 For further discussion see Coventry and Kriegel, "Locke on Consciousness," 236–237; Hamou, 
"Locke and Descartes on Selves and Thinking Substances," 124–129; Weinberg, Consciousness in 
Locke, 81–83. 
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As for our own Existence, we perceive it so plainly, and so certainly, that it neither needs, 
nor is capable of any proof. For nothing can be more evident to us, than our own 
Existence. I think, I reason, I feel Pleasure and Pain; Can any of these be more evident to me, 
than my own Existence? If I doubt of all other Things, that very doubt makes me 
perceive my own Existence, and will not suffer me to doubt of that. … Experience then 
convinces us, that we have an intuitive Knowledge of our own Existence, and an internal infallible 
Perception that we are. In every Act of Sensation, Reasoning, or Thinking, we are 
conscious to our selves of our own Being; and, in this Matter, come not short of the 
highest degree of Certainty. (Essay IV.ix.3) 
 
For Locke every act of perception gives me immediate knowledge of my own existence. This 
means that the act of thinking gives me immediate certainty of the existence of a thinker, or a 
being that thinks. It is worth noting Locke’s version of the cogito—just as Descartes’s—does not 
provide a metaphysical description of the thinking subject. In contrast to Descartes, for Locke 
knowledge of my own existence does not play a foundational role in the acquisition of 
knowledge.6 
Relatedly, Locke argues in his correspondence with Edward Stillingfleet (1635–1699), 
Bishop of Worcester, that thinking requires a substance in which the thinking takes place: 
 
First, we experiment in ourselves thinking. The idea of this action or mode of thinking is 
inconsistent with the idea of self-subsistance, and therefore has a necessary connexion 
with a support or subject of inhesion: the idea of that support is what we call substance; 
and so from thinking experimented in us, we have a proof of a thinking substance in us, 
which in my sense is a spirit.7  
 
Locke further clarifies that he uses the terms ‘soul’ and ‘spirit’ to refer to a thinking substance. 
While we can know that thinking substance exist on the basis of our experience of thinking, we 
are not in a position to prove whether thinking substances are material or immaterial.8 
 
 
2. What does ‘I’ refer to? Locke on person, man, and substance  
 
Through experiences such as sensations, feelings, or reasoning I have immediate and intuitive 
knowledge of my own existence. However, this intuitive knowledge of my own existence does 
not extend beyond the present moment when I have said experiences. Nor does it tell me 
anything about the metaphysical constitution of the being that I am at that present time. 
																																																						
6 According to Locke, intuitive knowledge is immediate and irresistible and includes knowledge 
of propositions such as red is not blue, a circle is not a square, or three is equal to one and two 
(see Essay IV.ii.1). Knowledge of my own existence does not have a special status in comparison 
to other propositions that we can know intuitively. For a helpful analysis of the differences 
between Locke’s and Descartes’s versions of the cogito, see Hamou, "Locke and Descartes on 
Selves and Thinking Substances," 124–129. 
7 John Locke, The Works of John Locke, new, corrected ed., 10 vols. (London: Thomas Tegg, 
1823), 4:33. 
8 See Works, 4:33–37. See also Essay IV.iii.6. 
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Additionally, we may be interested in understanding what the necessary and sufficient conditions 
are for my continued existence over time. What explains that I am now the same as the five-year 
old that I see in a photo in front of me? In order to answer such questions, Locke believes that 
we have to adopt a more abstract standpoint and first clarify what ‘I’ refers to. Although we 
often do not carefully distinguish in ordinary language whether ‘I’ signifies what Locke calls a 
person or a man,9 he emphasizes that this conceptual distinction is important if we want to 
engage with questions of identity over time (see Essay II.xxvii.7, 15, 20). For Locke ‘person’ 
stands for “a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider it self as 
it self, the same thinking thing in different times and places” (Essay II.xxvii.9). Persons 
understand themselves as extended into the past and future and who are concerned for their 
happiness and accountable for their actions (see Essay II.xxvii.17, 25–26).10 By contrast, ‘man’ 
refers to human beings, though Locke leaves open whether human beings are material living 
animals, composed of an immaterial substance that is united to a material body, or perhaps even 
just an immaterial substance (see Essay II.xxvii.21, 29).11 According to Locke, we give names to 
our mental ideas of a person or a man in order to communicate about them. The immediate 
significations of the names ‘person’ and ‘man’ are complex abstract ideas, namely ideas that we 
associate with being a person or man respectively.12  It is worth noting that Locke’s claim that it 
is important to distinguish the idea of a person from that of a man does not tell us whether at a 
metaphysical level there is just one entity at a time that is both a person and a man or whether 
there are two metaphysically distinct entities.13 
To see why Locke emphasizes that the idea of a person should be distinguished from 
that of a human being, it is helpful to turn to examples that motivate his position. Consider 
someone in an irreversible coma. In such a case, Locke would argue that the individual in the 
coma is the same human being as they were before falling into the coma, but they are not the 
																																																						
9 Locke’s term ‘man’ refers to human beings irrespective of sex or gender. 
10 I offer a more detailed explanation why I believe it is plausible to understand Locke’s 
characterization of a ‘person’ in Essay II.xxvii.9 in conjunction with the characterization that he 
gives of a person in Essay II.xxvii.26 in Ruth Boeker, "The Moral Dimension in Locke's Account 
of Persons and Personal Identity," History of Philosophy Quarterly 31 (2014). 
11 Since Locke’s primary aim in Essay II.xxvii is to argue that personal identity consists in 
sameness of consciousness, it is not significant for him to decide which of the different possible 
meanings of ‘man’ that he lists in II.xxvii.21 is correct. In either case, he believes that it is 
important to distinguish the idea of a person from that of a man and claims that “personal 
Identity can by us be placed in nothing but consciousness … without involving us in great 
Absurdities.” (Essay II.xxvii.21) He also mentions the possibility that ‘man’ refers to the soul 
alone in Essay II.xxvii.5, though there he goes on to say  that this is “very strange use of the word 
Man” (Essay II.xxvii.5). 
12 See Essay III.i–iii, IV.v. 
13 The question whether there is just one entity that is both F and G or two distinct entities, one 
F and one G, where ‘F’ and ‘G’ are kind terms, has received much attention in the secondary 
literature, especially by interpreters who either ascribe a relative identity interpretation or a 
coincidence interpretation to Locke. I question that Locke’s texts commits him to either reading 
(see Ruth Boeker, Locke on Persons and Personal Identity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
forthcoming).). For a defence of the coincidence interpretation see Vere Chappell, "Locke and 
Relative Identity," History of Philosophy Quarterly 6 (1989). For a detailed summary of the debates 
and a defence of a relative identity interpretation see Matthew Stuart, Locke's Metaphysics (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2013), ch. 7. 
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same person as before, because they are unconscious and unable to remember any former 
experiences. Moreover, it would be unjust to hold someone in a coma responsible for actions 
done by the same human being at an earlier time if they are unable to understand why they are 
rewarded or punished for it. This example shows that it is possible for a human being to 
continue to exist over time even if the person has ceased to exist.  
Locke further believes that a person’s continued existence over time does not require the 
continued existence of the same human being. He illustrates this claim with his example of the 
prince and the cobbler (see Essay II.xxvii.15). The example invites us to imagine that “the Soul of 
a Prince, carrying with it the consciousness of the Prince’s past Life, enter and inform the body 
of a Cobler” after the soul of the prince and all the conscious experiences that it carries have 
been removed from the body of the prince. In this case, Locke argues that the being composed 
of the cobler’s body and the prince’s soul is the same person as the former prince and 
“accountable only for the Prince’s Actions” (Essay II.xxvii.15). Although the scenario can seem 
far fetched in ordinary life, the opening sentence of the section suggests that Locke believes that 
it is possible that at the resurrection a person may have a different body than they had during life 
on Earth.  
Locke assumes in the example of the prince and the cobbler that consciousness is carried 
by a soul. Yet it is worth noting that Locke does not identify our idea of a person with that of a 
soul. A soul for Locke is a thinking substance, irrespective of whether it is material or immaterial. 
Due to our limited understanding of the nature of substances Locke argues further that 
sameness of substances may be neither necessary nor sufficient for personal identity (see Essay 
II.xxvii.12–14). It is not sufficient, because we cannot rule out that you now have the same soul 
that once inhabited Socrates’s body. However, if it is impossible for you to access and recall any 
of Socrates’s thoughts and actions, then you are not the same person as Socrates (see Essay 
II.xxvii.14). Furthermore, sameness of substance is not necessary, because Locke argues that a 
person can continue to exist despite a change of substance (see Essay II.xxvii.12–13). 
 
 
3. Being a person, being self to my self 
 
So far I have explained why Locke emphasizes that we should distinguish the idea of a person 
from that of a human being and that of a substance.  However, how do these ideas relate to our 
concept of self? Throughout his discussion of persons and personal identity in Essay II.xxvii.9–
27 Locke switches between using the terms ‘person’ and ‘self’ and several interpreters argue that 
he regards the two terms as synonymous.14 For instance, the following passage supports this 
reading: 
																																																						
14 See Vili Lähteenmäki, "Locke and the Metaphysics of "State of Sensibility"," in Philosophy of 
Mind in the Early Modern and Modern Ages: The History of the Philosophy of Mind, ed. Rebecca 
Copenhaver (London and New York: Routledge, 2018), 165; Galen Strawson, Locke on Personal 
Identity: Consciousness and Concernment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011); "'The Secrets 
of All Hearts': Locke on Personal Identity," Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 76 (2015): 113; 
Stuart, Locke's Metaphysics, 342, n. 3; Weinberg, Consciousness in Locke, 147, n. 7; "The Metaphysical 
Fact of Consciousness in Locke's Theory of Personal Identity," Journal of the History of Philosophy 
50 (2012): 388, n. 5. A notable exception is Udo Thiel, "Personal Identity," in The Cambridge 
History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, ed. Daniel Garber and Michael Ayers (Cambridge: 
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Self is that conscious thinking thing, (whatever Substance, made up of whether Spiritual, 
or Material, or Compounded, it matters not) which is sensible, or conscious of Pleasure 
and Pain, capable of Happiness or Misery, and so is concern’d for it self, as far as that 
consciousness extends. (Essay II.xxvii.17) 
 
While in many passages the term ‘self’ can easily be replaced by ‘person’, and vice versa, 
Weinberg notes that in some places the term ‘self’ is used to express a first-personal point of 
view, while ‘person’ denotes a third-personal point of view.15 Acknowledging the difference of 
perspective helps make sense of the following passage: 
 
“Person, as I take it, is the name for this self. Where-ever a Man finds, what he calls 
himself, there I think another may say is the same Person.” (Essay II.xxvii.26) 
 
To further substantiate why it is plausible to regard Lockean selves as persons, at least in 
the context of the chapter “Of Identity and Diversity” (Essay II.xxvii),16 I want to return to his 
version of the cogito (see Essay IV.ix) and explain how his concept of self in II.xxvii is richer and 
more complex than the I-concept that he invokes when he claims that my thoughts give me 
intuitive and immediate knowledge of my own existence. In order to establish my own existence, 
a singular thought in the present moment is sufficient.17 By contrast, the self that Locke 
describes in Essay II.xxvii regards multiple thoughts and actions as their own, or as Locke would 
say appropriates them (see Essay II.xxvii.16–17, 26).18 Furthermore, a self experiences multiple 
thoughts and actions as unified, not only at a time, but also over time:19  
 
For it is by the consciousness it has of its present Thoughts and Actions, that it is self to it 
self now, and so will be the same self as far as the same consciousness can be extended to 
Actions past or to come (Essay II.xxvii.10) 
 
																																																						
Cambridge University Press, 1998), who argues that “Locke’s position is that ‘man’ and ‘person’ 
denote different abstract ideas which may be applied to the self” (889). This reading is motivated 
by his relative identity interpretation of Locke. In his later book The Early Modern Subject, Thiel 
uses ‘human subject’ in the sense in which he uses ‘self’ (or ‘human self’) in his earlier work (for 
instance, see The Early Modern Subject, 107.) 
15 See Weinberg, Consciousness in Locke, 147, n. 7; "The Metaphysical Fact of Consciousness," 388, 
n. 5. See also Lähteenmäki, "Locke and the Metaphysics of "State of Sensibility"," 165. 
16 Locke’s chapter “Of Identity and Diversity” (Essay II.xxvii) was added to the second edition of 
the Essay in 1694 upon the recommendation of his friend and correspondent William Molyneux. 
Since Locke does not explicitly distinguish the idea of a person from that of a human being in 
the first edition we cannot assume that he regards selves as persons in other parts of the Essay. 
17 See Essay IV.ix.3. 
18 Although some interpreters, including Antonia LoLordo, Locke's Moral Man (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), ch. 2., interpret Locke’s account of personal identity in terms of 
appropriation, I question recent so-called appropriation interpretations in Ruth Boeker, "The 
Role of Appropriation in Locke's Account of Persons and Personal Identity," Locke Studies 16 
(2016).  
19 See also Essay II.xxvii.16, 23, 25. 
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Let me further illustrate the unity—or as we may also say togetherness—of different experiences 
that Locke describes in this claim. In the present moment I may read a book and as I perceive 
the words on the page I simultaneously hear birds singing outside my window. Locke would say 
that same consciousness makes it possible to experience the visual and the oral perceptions as 
unified into one self. Moreover, I may remember cooking dinner last night or helping a friend 
two weeks ago. As I recall these former experiences I am not only aware of previously cooking 
dinner or helping my friend, but this perception is accompanied by the awareness that I have had 
the experience before (see Essay I.iv.20, II.x.2).20 This means that memory21 makes it possible to 
access past experiences. Moreover, I can ascribe them to my present self and in virtue of the 
unifying aspect of same consciousness past and present experiences are united within the same 
self.  Same consciousness makes it possible not only to experience thoughts and actions as 
unified, but also bodily parts, and even substances, can be united with the self (see Essay II.10–
11, 16, 23–25). For instance, if my hand feels cold, the intimate feeling makes the hand a part of 
my self (see Essay II.xxvii.11,17–18, 25).  
Locke further writes that a self has a continued duration: 
 
This every intelligent Being, sensible of Happiness or Misery, must grant, that there is 
something that is himself, that he is concerned for, and would have happy; that this self has 
existed in a continued Duration more than one instant, and therefore ’tis possible may 
exist, as it has done, Months and Years to come, without any certain bounds to be set to 
its duration; and may be the same self, by the same consciousness, continued on for the 
future. And thus, by this consciousness, he finds himself to be the same self which did 
such or such an Action some Years since, by which he comes to be happy or miserable 
now. (Essay II.xxvii.25) 
 
Duration makes it possible to experience the different thoughts and actions, bodily parts, and 
perhaps also substances, that are unified within one self as temporally ordered.  
Locke argues repeatedly that personal identity consists in sameness of consciousness, or 
that same consciousness makes me self to my self. In these contexts, he often uses the 
expression ‘same consciousness’. I take it that his notion of same consciousness that plays a 
																																																						
20 See also Don Garrett, "Locke on Personal Identity, Consciousness, and “Fatal Errors”," 
Philosophical Topics 31 (2003): 100. 
21 Although memory certainly plays an important role in Locke’s account of personal identity, I 
do not think that his notion of sameness of consciousness can be reduced to memory. On the 
contrary, Locke has good reasons for claiming that personal identity consists in sameness of 
consciousness. Consciousness is not restricted to past experiences, but includes awareness of 
present experiences and can extend into the future. Other interpreters who argue that for Locke 
sameness of consciousness does not reduce to memory include Margaret Atherton, "Locke's 
Theory of Personal Identity," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 8 (1983); Samuel C. Rickless, Locke 
(Hoboken: Wiley Blackwell, 2014), ch. 8; Strawson, Locke on Personal Identity, ch. 9; Weinberg, 
Consciousness in Locke, ch. 4; Gideon Yaffe, "Locke on Ideas of Identity and Diversity," in The 
Cambridge Companion to Locke's "Essay Concerning Human Understanding", ed. Lex Newman 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Memory interpretations can be traced back at 
least to Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, III.6, 277. For a recent defence of a memory 
interpretation see Stuart, Locke's Metaphysics, ch. 8. 
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central role in his discussion of personal identity is richer than the conscious awareness that is 
built into individual perceptions. Same consciousness not only allows me to experience thoughts 
and actions as mine, but also as unified at a time and over time, and temporally ordered. Thereby 
I am self to my self and extend into the past and future. 
 
 
4. Personal identity, moral accountability, and the afterlife 
 
Locke advances the philosophical debates about selfhood, persons, and personal identity by 
insisting that we have to distinguish the idea of a person from that of a human being. In this 
section I aim to show that his moral and religious views offer helpful explanations why he argues 
that we need the concept of a person in addition to that of a human being.  
If we reflect for a moment on Locke’s larger philosophical project, it will become clear 
why it is helpful to consider his account of persons and personal identity in the context of his 
moral and religious views. Locke argues that many metaphysical truths such as truths about “the 
internal Fabrick and real Essences of Bodies” (Essay IV.xii.11) remain unknown to us as humans 
due to the limitations of human understanding.22 However, he believes that limited insight into 
metaphysics does not undermine morality and religion (see Essay IV.iii.6, IV.xii.11) and argues 
that we make best use of our capacities if we devote our time to morality and religion. Indeed, he 
claims that “that Morality is the proper Science, and Business of Mankind in general” (Essay IV.xii.11).23 
Locke is interested in developing an account of persons and personal identity that is 
suitable to answer questions of moral accountability. As the example of a patient in a coma 
above has shown, the patient in a coma continues to exist as a human being, but Locke would 
argue that it is unjust to hold them accountable for actions formerly done by the same human 
being. For him, persons rather than human beings are subjects of moral accountability (see Essay 
II.xxvii.13, 15–16, 18–20, 22, 26). This is most explicit in Essay II.xxvii.26 where Locke claims 
that ‘person’ is a forensic term, which means that persons are moral and legal beings.24 They are 
“intelligent Agents capable of a Law, and Happiness and Misery.” (Essay II.xxvii.26) 
Let us consider more closely what role questions of moral accountability play in Locke’s 
thinking about persons and personal identity. It is widely accepted that moral accountability 
presupposes personal identity. However, philosophers who accept this proposition disagree how 
we can best understand the persistence conditions for persons. Some accept that a person 
continues to exist in virtue of the continued existence of the whole human being, others focus 
on bodily or biological continuity, again others may argue that personal identity consists in the 
																																																						
22 It is worth noting that Locke does not reject metaphysical knowledge entirely. For instance, he 
accepts that we can know that God exists (see IV.x), or that substances exist (see Locke, Works, 
4:32–33.). 
23 For helpful further discussion of Locke’s philosophical project see Victor Nuovo, John Locke: 
The Philosopher as Christian Virtuoso (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). 
24 For a more detailed analysis see Boeker, "The Moral Dimension in Locke's Account of 
Persons and Personal Identity." Edmund Law, A Defence of Mr. Locke's Opinion Concerning Personal 
Identity; in Answer to the First Part of a Late Essay on That Subject (Cambridge: Printed by J. 
Archdeacon, 1769), is one of Locke’s early interpreters, who emphasizes, that for Locke ‘person’ 
is a forensic term. See also Jessica Spector, "The Grounds of Moral Agency: Locke's Account of 
Personal Identity," Journal of Moral Philosophy 5 (2008). 
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continued existence of an immaterial soul, and a further option is to follow Locke and claim that 
personal identity consists in sameness of consciousness, or some other psychological relations.25 
To see why Locke favors his proposed view, namely that personal identity consists in sameness 
of consciousness, it is helpful to examine his understanding of moral accountability and show 
how it informs his thinking about personal identity over time.  
Locke thinks about moral accountability in particular and controversial ways, as becomes 
clear in his remarks about accountability for crimes committed while drunk. The question is 
whether someone is responsible now for a crime which was done in a state of drunkenness and 
which the person now is unable to remember. Locke compares this case with sleepwalking and 
argues that both cases should be treated on par (see Essay II.xxvii.22).26 For him it is unjust to be 
accountable for an action that a person now is unable remember as their own.  
This view troubled his contemporaries, including his friend and correspondent William 
Molyneux (1656–1698), who first suggested to him that he write the chapter, which became the 
chapter “Of Identity and Diversity” (Essay II.xxvii).27 Locke sent Molyneux a draft of the chapter 
before it went to the press and in subsequent correspondence Molyneux challenges Locke’s 
views about drunkenness. According to Molyneux, “Drunkennes is it self a Crime, and therefore 
no one shall alledge it in excuse of an other Crime.”28 Drunkenness is voluntary and thus 
Molyneux believes that one should be held accountable for any consequences of getting drunk, 
including criminal actions. 
Despite the opportunity to react to Molyneux’s criticism prior to the publication of the 
chapter Locke does not revise his theory. Rather the fact that he insists that a person, who is 
now held accountable for a past action, must have been conscious at the time when the action 
was done and must now be able to remember it shows that it is important for him that a person 
from the inside can regard the action as their own, which enables them to understand why they 
are justly rewarded or punished for it. Otherwise punishing a person for an action that they are 
entirely unaware of would be like punishing “one Twin for what his Brother-Twin did, whereof 
he knew nothing, because their outsides were so like, that they could not be distinguished; for 
such Twins have been seen.” (Essay II.xxvii.19) Locke further compares punishment for actions 
of which one “could be made to have no consciousness at all” to “being created miserable” 
(Essay II.xxvii.26). 
One may worry that Locke’s view makes it too easy for a criminal to get off the hook if 
they pretend not to remember doing a crime that is ascribed to them by others. Locke is well 
aware that his consciousness-based account of personal identity is of limited practical use in 
ordinary human law courts, because a human judge cannot look into another person’s mind to 
find out whether they are actually able to remember a past crime. Indeed, he acknowledges that 
human law courts follow other practices: 
 
																																																						
25 This list of options is not meant to be exhaustive. 
26 See also John Locke, The Correspondence of John Locke, ed. E. S. de Beer, 8 vols. (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1976–1989), letter 1693, 4:785–786. 
27 For a more detailed discussion of Locke’s and Molyneux’s relationship see Ruth Boeker, 
"Locke and William Molyneux," in The Lockean Mind, ed. Jessica Gordon-Roth and Shelley 
Weinberg (Abingdon: Routledge, forthcoming). 
28 Locke, Correspondence, letter 1685, 4:767. A similar criticism can be found in Leibniz, New 
Essays, II.xxvii.22, 243. 
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For though punishment be annexed to personality, and personality to consciousness, and 
the Drunkard perhaps be not conscious of what he did; yet Humane Judicatures justly 
punish him; because the Fact is proved against him, but want of consciousness cannot be 
proved for him. (Essay II.xxvii.22) 
 
Locke does not attempt to revise the practices of human law courts, but rather his view 
is ultimately directed towards a divine last judgement, as the next sentence of the quoted passage 
shows: 
 
But in the great Day, wherein the Secrets of all Hearts shall be laid open, it may be 
reasonable to think, no one shall be made to answer for what he knows nothing of; but 
shall receive his Doom, his Conscience accusing or excusing him. (Essay II.xxvii.22) 
 
Locke believes that any injustice that can occur in human law courts can be corrected in a divine 
law court.29 It is worth noting that Locke understands a divine judgement, at least in part, as a 
self-judgement, because he claims that a person’s “Conscience [is] accusing or excusing him.” 
(Essay II.xxvii.22) In contrast to some other philosophers, who believe that it is sufficient that 
God—regarded as an external judge—knows all the facts and rewards and punishes resurrected 
persons based on their past deeds,30 Locke emphasizes that a person at the great day will be 
conscious of all the relevant former thoughts and actions once “the Secrets of all Hearts” have 
been laid open. A person’s consciousness of their former thoughts and actions makes it possible 
that they from the inside understand whether they deserve reward or punishment and thus their 
conscience is involved in reaching the final judgement.  
It is time to return to the question as to how Locke’s views about moral accountability 
inform his thinking about personal identity. There is no doubt that his understanding of moral 
accountability is controversial and impracticable in human law courts, but the fact that Locke 
emphasizes that a person from the inside should be able understand why they are held 
accountable explains why he regards sameness of consciousness as necessary for personal 
identity. Molyneux, who argues that a drunkard should be held accountable for a crime done 
under the influence of alcohol, even if they are unable to remember it afterwards, cannot appeal 
to Locke’s consciousness-based account of personal identity in order to show that the person 
who committed the crime is identical with the person who is now accused of it. Instead 
Molyneux has to explain a person’s continued existence over time differently, for instance, in 
terms of bodily continuity, assuming he accepts the commonly held view that moral 
accountability presupposes personal identity.31  
Although Locke’s understanding of moral accountability explains why he regards 
sameness of consciousness as necessary for personal identity, it is by itself insufficient to explain 
																																																						
29 See Udo Thiel, Lockes Theorie der personalen Identität (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1983), 144–151; 
"Personal Identity," 894–896; The Early Modern Subject, 130–134. 
30 Such a view is held, for instance, by Leibniz, New Essays, II.xxvii.22, II.xxvii.26, 243–244, 246. 
31 I believe that Locke is well aware of these implications of Molyneux’s view, as he writes in 
response to Molyneux’s proposal that “it overturns [his] hypothesis” (Locke, Correspondence, letter 
1693, 4:785.) For further discussion see Ruth Boeker, "Locke and Hume on Personal Identity: 
Moral and Religious Differences," Hume Studies 41 (2015); Locke on Persons and Personal Identity. 
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why he emphasizes the conceptual distinction between persons and human beings. Alternatively, 
one can propose that personal identity consists in the continued existence of a human being32 
and personal identity is one among other necessary conditions for moral accountability. This 
alternative view, in contrast to the view that Locke offers, does not require a distinction between 
persons and human beings. Moreover, this alternative view has the resources to accommodate 
Locke’s claim that moral accountability presupposes the ability to be conscious of the action in 
question, because it can be added as a necessary condition for moral accountability. This means 
that one can argue that moral accountability does not only require the continued existence of a 
human being, but additionally that the human being was conscious of doing the relevant action 
at the initial time and is now able to remember the action, and possibly additional necessary 
conditions may have to be satisfied for moral accountability, for instance, that one was free to 
perform the action rather than being coerced to doing it. To be clear, Locke does not endorse 
this alternative view, but rather insists, first, that the idea of a person should be distinguished 
from that of a human being and, second, that personal identity consists in sameness of 
consciousness.  
Why does Locke favor his view? I believe that he has good reasons to prefer his view, 
because he is a Christian believer and aims to offer a theory of personal identity that can make 
sense of the possibility of a person’s continued existence in the afterlife.33 His predecessors who 
do not distinguish persons from human beings or substances either face metaphysical difficulties 
to explain how human beings are resurrected and continue to exist in the afterlife or their views 
can lead to serious moral injustice.34 If materialism is correct and human beings are material 
living organisms, then those who fail to distinguish persons from human beings face difficulties 
to explain how human beings, who cease to exist at bodily death continue to exist in the afterlife. 
If immaterialism is correct, it may seem that the continued existence of an immaterial substance 
is sufficient to explain the afterlife. However, Locke would disagree, because he argues that 
merely tracing the continued existence of an immaterial substance can lead to moral injustice. 
For instance, if you now have the same immaterial substance that once inhabited Socrates’s 
body, it is possible that an individual at the last divine judgement will be held accountable both 
for Socrates’s actions and your actions. Assuming that your consciousness is entirely 
unconnected with Socrates’s consciousness, Locke considers it to be unjust to hold one 
(resurrected) individual to be accountable for entirely unconnected conscious experiences.35 
Furthermore, for him the afterlife is “a state of sensibility.” He already adopts this view in 1682 
and claims in a journal entry that by “immortality … is not meant a state of bare substantiall 
existence and duration but a state of sensibility.”36 He continues to conceive of the afterlife as a 
																																																						
32 At this stage I leave open whether human beings are material living organisms, immaterial 
substances, or unions of material bodies and immaterial substances just as Locke does in Essay 
II.xxvii.21.  
33 See Essay IV.xviii.7. 
34 For a more detailed discussion see Ruth Boeker, "Locke on Personal Identity: A Response to 
the Problems of His Predecessors," Journal of the History of Philosophy 55 (2017).  
35 Locke describes similar cases by speaking of “two distinct incommunicable consciousnesses” 
(Essay II.xxvii.23, see also II.xxvii.20). 
36 John Locke, An Early Draft of Locke's Essay, Together with Excerpts from His Journals, ed. R. I. 
Aaron and Jocelyn Gibb (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936), 121. 
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“state of Sensibility” in Essay IV.iii.6, where he argues that “[a]ll the great Ends of Morality and 
Religion, are well enough secured, without philosophical Proofs of the Soul’s Immateriality.”  
 
 
5. Locke’s early critics and defenders  
 
Locke’s new account of persons and personal identity is widely discussed soon after its 
publication and many of Locke’s early critics reject or question it on metaphysical and religious 
grounds.37 For instance, they worry that Locke’s view undermines immortality and the Christian 
belief in the resurrection. However, Locke’s critics often neglect his distinctions between the 
concepts of person, human being, and substance and often assume that persons are human 
beings or immaterial substances. It remains to ask why many of his critics rejected, or failed to 
acknowledge, the innovative aspects of his view. 
I do not have the scope here to rehearse all the many objections that have been raised 
against Locke’s view. Instead I want to focus on one concern, namely the question whether a 
person’s existence over time can be interrupted by gaps in consciousness. For instance, 
unconscious sleep or the state between death and resurrection are probably periods when a 
person is not actually thinking. Many Locke scholars accept that for Locke a person’s existence 
over time can be have gaps due to periods of unconsciousness.38 It is possible to argue that a 
person continues to exist during a period of unconscious sleep, because they continue to have 
the ability to think and remember their former experiences, even if they are not actually thinking. 
However, the same type of response is not as easily available with regard to the period between 
death and resurrection. Locke remains agnostic whether thinking substances are material or 
immaterial (see Essay IV.iii.6). If it is the case that thinking inheres in a material substance, then 
not only actual thoughts, but also the ability to think would cease at bodily death. Consequently, 
if materialism is correct, Locke should accept that it is possible that not only actual thinking, but 
																																																						
37 See Thiel, "Personal Identity," 897–899; "Religion and Materialist Metaphysics: Some Aspects 
of the Debate About the Resurrection of the Body in Eighteenth-Century Britain," in Philosophy 
and Religion in Enlightenment Britain: New Case Studies, ed. Ruth Savage (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012); The Early Modern Subject, chs. 5–8. 
38 See Vere Chappell, "Locke on the Ontology of Matter, Living Things and Persons," 
Philosophical Studies 60 (1990): 30; Christopher Hughes Conn, Locke on Essence and Identity, 
Philosophical Studies Series (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003), 70–71,79; Joshua 
Hoffman, "Locke on Whether a Thing Can Have Two Beginnings of Existence," Ratio 22 
(1980); Nicholas Jolley, Locke's Touchy Subjects: Materialism and Immortality (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015), 101; Dan Kaufman, "The Resurrection of the Same Body and the 
Ontological Status of Organisms: What Locke Should Have (and Could Have) Told 
Stillingfleet," in Contemporary Perspectives on Early Modern Philosophy: Essays in Honor of Vere Chappell, 
ed. Paul Hoffman, David Owen, and Gideon Yaffe (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 
2008), 208–211; Lähteenmäki, "Locke and the Metaphysics of "State of Sensibility"," 163–165; 
Stuart, Locke's Metaphysics, 378–383; Thiel, The Early Modern Subject, 124–125, 139, 217; Gideon 
Yaffe, "Locke on Consciousness, Personal Identity and the Idea of Duration," Noûs 45 (2011). A 
notable exception is Weinberg, Consciousness in Locke, 156–157; "Locke on Personal Identity," 
Philosophy Compass 6 (2011): 402–405; "The Metaphysical Fact of Consciousness," 393–394. 
However, Weinberg does not directly engage with the challenge that a person may cease to exist 
between death and resurrection. 
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also a person’s ability to think is interrupted between death and resurrection, which would be a 
genuine gap in a person’s existence over time. 
The question whether a person or a soul thinks uninterruptedly is lively debated by 
Locke’s contemporaries and predecessors. Descartes, for instance, accepts that the soul always 
thinks and writes in a letter to Hyperaspistes: “I had reason to assert that the human soul, 
wherever it be, even in the mother’s womb, is always thinking.”39 Descartes argues that this 
follows from his view that thinking is the essence of the soul. Locke does not want to be 
committed to Descartes’s metaphysical views about substances and essences, because he believes 
that real essences of substances are unknown to us due to the limitations of human 
understanding. Locke does not deny that souls always think, because this claim is a hypothesis 
and neither it nor the opposite can be demonstrated, but rather he argues that it is highly unlikely 
that the soul always thinks. This means that he takes seriously the possibility that a substance can 
cease to think, for instance, during unconscious sleep or between death and resurrection (see 
Essay II.i.9–19).40 
Locke’s view that a person’s existence over time can have gaps worried several of his 
contemporaries. One of them is Elizabeth Berkeley Burnet (1661–1709), who is a close friend of 
Locke and started corresponding with him in 1696.41 She is also a close friend of Stillingfleet. 
Stillingfleet’s publication of his A Discourse in Vindication of the Trinity42 in 1697 started a heated 
public correspondence between Locke and Stillingfleet. Burnet (then Berkeley) closely follows 
the dispute between her two friends and adopts a mediating stance, but also makes clear her 
points of philosophical disagreement.43 In a letter to Locke, dated 17 October 1699, she reflects 
on the question whether consciousness can be interrupted between death and resurrection and 
writes: 
 
Since my coming into the Countrey reflecting on some discourse I had in Town, 
concerning the state of the soul after death, I seet my self to read the new Testement as 
heedfully as I could with a regard only to that perticuler, and I confess I find many texts 
																																																						
39 René Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, ed. John Cottingham, et al., trans. John 
Cottingham, et al., 3 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984–1991), AT III:423–
424/CSMK III:189–190. See also The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, AT V:192–193/CSMK 
III:354–355; AT VII:356–357/CSM II:246–247.  
40 For further discussion see Boeker, "Locke on Personal Identity," 420–422; Hamou, "Locke 
and Descartes on Selves and Thinking Substances."; Jolley, Locke's Touchy Subjects, ch. 2. 
41 For further background see Jacqueline Broad, Women Philosophers of Seventeenth-Century England: 
Selected Correspondence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming), ch. 4. See also "Selfhood 
and Self-Government in Women's Religious Writings of the Early Modern Period," International 
Journal of Philosophical Studies 27 (forthcoming); Frances Harris, "Burnet [Neé Blake; Other Married 
Name Berkeley], Elizabeth (1661–1709)," Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004).  
42 Edward Stillingfleet, A Discourse in Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity: With an Answer to the 
Late Socinian Objections against It from Scripture, Antiquity and Reason. And a Preface Concerning the 
Different Explications of the Trinity, and the Tendency of the Present Socinian Controversie (London: Printed 
by I. H. for Henry Mortlock at the Phoenix in S. Paul's Church-yard, 1697). 
43 For instance, she reminds Locke of the importance of interacting charitably with his critics 
(Locke, Correspondence, letter 2491, 2511, 6:483, 509–511.). For further details see Broad, Women 
Philosophers of Seventeenth-Century England, ch. 4. 
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that seem very favourable to that openion that suspends the happenesse of the soul to 
the generall Resurection and reunion with a Body, yet I think few of them are so express 
but that another sense may be given, and that for the more received openion of its 
keeping an uninterrupted self consiousness some places are very express and full, I own I 
am not quit an indifferent examiner!44 
 
Burnet makes clear that, although the Bible is not decisive, she believes that there are 
reasons to prefer the view that self-consciousness continues uninterruptedly.45 Her criticism of 
Locke’s view finds further expression in her private Religious Diary46 where she worries in a 
passage addressing “Mr L” that if a person’s (or soul’s) existence is interrupted, then it is hard to 
make sense of the resurrection, because after a person (or soul) has been annihilated it would 
have to be recreated, rather than resurrected: 
   
If your notion implys an extengusing [extinguishing] that breath or flame of life is not 
that the same with Anihilation, & then life would not be resurection but recreation, is it 
not more probable the spirit or principle of life exists with God or hovers in an 
imperfect state, in expectation of a more perfect one at the resurection nor can any 
strong arguement be drawn from the words breath life soul, being used only for the 
present life in some places since they are used in others by those who beleeved & 
intended to express them to represent the soul as a separat substance (Religious Diary, fol. 
143r–143v) 
 
This shows that Burnet believes that in order to make sense of the religious belief in the 
resurrection it is important that a person, self, or soul continues to exist without any gaps. 
Whether Locke has a satisfying response to this worry depends on how we spell what he means 
by sameness of consciousness—a question that is still controversially debated among Locke 
scholars.47  
Does Burnet fall back to an immaterial substance view of self? In my view there is not 
sufficient textual evidence to support (or rule out) this reading. Locke and Stillingfleet repeatedly 
discuss questions concerning the individuation of human beings and persons and consider what 
distinguishes Peter from John.48 In a letter to Locke, dated 22 September 1697, Burnet admits 
that she finds it difficult to see “where the true strength of this dispute rests.”49  
																																																						
44 Locke, Correspondence, letter 2627, 6:707. 
45 See Correspondence, letter 2627, 6:707–708. 
46 Elizabeth Berkeley Burnet, "Religious Diary," (Bodleian Libraries, Oxford, MS Rawlinson D 
1092, n.d.). 
47 Some recent proposal by Locke scholars include Atherton, "Locke's Theory of Personal 
Identity."; Garrett, "Locke on Personal Identity, Consciousness, and “Fatal Errors”."; Jolley, 
Locke's Touchy Subjects; Lähteenmäki, "Locke and the Metaphysics of "State of Sensibility"."; 
LoLordo, Locke's Moral Man, ch. 2; Strawson, Locke on Personal Identity; Stuart, Locke's Metaphysics, 
ch. 8; Weinberg, Consciousness in Locke, ch. 4; Kenneth P. Winkler, "Locke on Personal Identity," 
Journal of the History of Philosophy 29 (1991). 
48 See Locke, Works, 4:24–25, 72–74, 85–93, 161–180, 429–441. 
49 Correspondence, letter 2315, 6:203. The letter continues: 
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I want to draw attention to another passage from her “Religious Diary” where she speaks 
of “that self cons[c]ious princeple which alone is properly us or our selves” (“Religious Diary,” 
fol. 145r). Although at first sight this description looks strikingly similar to Locke’s view, she 
discusses sin and evil in the same and surrounding sentences. The context reveals that her 
primary concern is moral and religious self-improvement, which intimates that for her being self-
conscious has a moral dimension. Burnet believes that we can escape external evils, but that sins 
are internal and not easy to escape. Yet the presence of sin and evil can bring us closer to 
ourselves. While Burnet’s view may be inspired by Locke, she certainly develops her own 
approach to the self and focuses on the role that self-consciousness can play with regard to 
moral and religious self-improvement.  
Let us return to the question whether a person’s existence over time can have gaps. This 
issue worried not only Elizabeth Berkeley Burnet, but also plays a central role in anonymously 
published Remarks Upon an Essay Concerning Humane Understanding.50 The author, whom I will 
hereafter call “the Remarker,”51 criticizes Locke for making two problematic assumptions: First, 
that Locke “suppose[s] that the Soul may … be sometimes absolutely without thoughts of one 
kind or other; and [second] that God may, if he pleases … give, or have given to some Systems 
of Matter, a Power to conceive and think.” (Remarks, 8) Given these two assumptions, the 
Remarker objects, that a proof of the immortality of the soul is undermined.  
 Locke is not impressed by the arguments of the Remarker and, besides a short 
postscript that he added to the publication of his second letter to Stillingfleet, he does not 
respond publicly.52 Meanwhile the Remarker, who is still hoping for a response from Locke, 
																																																						
for by what my Lord [Stillingfleet] sayed of the common Nature of man I thought he had 
placed it in the likeness or sameness of that internall frame, or unknow substance which 
was peculiar to that order of Beings, but in this definition of person, methinks he makes 
that internall fram to deffer in every individual, and theirin to place personality; for if I 
suppose no externall difference, then the difference must be internall or none at all; 
except by this peculiar maner of subsistance is ment not a different internall substance, but 
distance of place, seperat existence and self consiousness, tho methinks the two first are 
external differences; I am by this convinct I neither understand the terms or what is ment 
by them (Correspondence, letter 2315, 6:203.). 
 
Here she comments on Stillingfleet’s views, who believes that one person differs from another 
by an internal difference. As Burnet analyses his view, he leaves open whether persons are 
individuated by a different internal substance or by self-consciousness, but rules out the other 
two options, namely distance of place or separate existence, because they are external criteria. 
50 Anon., Remarks Upon an Essay Concerning Humane Understanding in a Letter Address'd to the Author 
(London: Printed for M. Wotton, 1697). 
51 I follow Catharine Trotter Cockburn in referring to the author of Remarks as “the Remarker.” 
Although Thomas Burnet has until recently been assumed to be the author of Remarks upon an 
Essay concerning Humane Understanding, J. C. Walmsley, Hugh Craig, and John Burrows, "The 
Authorship of the Remarks Upon an Essay Concerning Humane Understanding," Eighteenth-Century 
Thought 6 (2016), argue convincingly that this attribution lacks evidence and that it is more likely 
that Richard Willis, successively bishop of Gloucester, Salisbury, and Winchester, is the author. 
52 See Locke, Works, 4:185–189. We have evidence, however, that Locke read Remarks, because 
he added handwritten marginal notes in his own copy of the pamphlet. See Marginalia in Anon. 
Remarks Upon an Essay Concerning Humane Understanding (1697) (Yale University: Beinecke Rare 
Book and Manuscript Library). 
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develops the arguments against Locke’s view further in Second Remarks53 and Third Remarks.54 
Catharine Trotter Cockburn (1679–1749) believes that Locke has been criticized unfairly and her 
Defence of Mr. Locke’s Essay of Human Understanding 55 offers clever arguments of her own in 
response to the Remarker’s objections and in support of Locke’s philosophy.  
Against the Remarker’s worry that gaps in consciousness undermine the immortality of 
the soul, she first points out that Locke never intended to prove immortality, because our belief 
in immortality is a matter of faith that cannot be demonstrated.56 Moreover, she points out that 
the Remarker neglects that for Locke the terms ‘person,’ ‘man,’ and ‘soul’ have different 
significations.57 Locke’s conceptual distinctions make it possible to ask questions that are 
otherwise unintelligible. For instance, Locke asks whether two different persons could at 
different periods of time exist within the same human being (see Essay II.xxvii.19). If the 
terminological distinctions between ‘person’ and ‘human being’ (or ‘man,’ as Locke would say,) 
are neglected, the question makes no sense. Putting aside the Remarker’s failure to adopt Locke’s 
new terminology, it is nevertheless worth examining the Remarker’s objection and Cockburn’s 
responses more closely. 
The Remarker finds it incomprehensible how there could be “a thoughtless, senseless, lifeless 
Soul”58 and challenges Locke by asking how a soul can begin to think again after a period without 
thinking: 
 
However, you ought to tell us, how you bring the Soul out of this unintelligible State. What 
Cause can you assign able to produce the first Thought at the end of this Sleep and Silence, 
in a total Ecclipse and intermission of Thinking? Upon your Supposition, That all our 
Thoughts perish in sound Sleep; and all Cogitation is extinct, we seem to have a new Soul 
every Morning. (Second Remarks, 16–17)  
 
Cockburn offers a series of arguments in response. First, she emphasizes our ignorance of 
mental operations and writes: 
 
Do you understand how the soul thinks at all? How it passes from one thought to another? 
How it preserves its treasure of ideas, to produce them at pleasure on occasions? And 
recollects those it had not in a long time reflected on? How it moves your body, or is 
affected by it? These are operations, which I suppose you are not so skeptical as to doubt 
of; nor yet pretend to understand how they are done (Defence, 57) 
																																																						
53 Anon., Second Remarks Upon an Essay Concerning Humane Understanding in a Letter Address'd to the 
Author, Being a Vindication of the First Remarks against the Answer of Mr. Lock, at the End of His Reply to 
the Lord Bishop of Worcester. (London: Printed for M. Wotton, 1697). 
54 Third Remarks Upon an Essay Concerning Humane Understanding in a Letter Address'd to the Author 
(London: Printed for M. Wotton, 1699). 
55 See Catharine Trotter Cockburn, A Defence of Mr. Locke's Essay of Human Understanding, in 
Catharine Trotter Cockburn, Philosophical Writings, ed. Patricia Sheridan (Peterborough, ON: 
Broadview Press, 2006 [1702]). 
56 See Defence, 53–54. See also Locke, Essay IV.xviii.7 and Jessica Gordon-Roth, "Catharine 
Trotter Cockburn's Defence of Locke," The Monist 98 (2015). 
57 Cockburn, Defence, 55–57. 
58 Anon., Second Remarks, 16. 
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Second, she draws an analogy between cogitation and soul, on the one hand, and motion 
and body, on the other hand.59 Motion cannot be restored and thus a new motion is numerically 
distinct from a previous motion. However, it is implausible to infer from this that a new body 
comes into existence whenever a new motion is produced. By analogy it is just as problematic to 
assume that whenever a new thought is produced a new soul comes into existence.60 
Moreover, she offers a reductio argument to reveal the absurdity of the Remarker’s 
assumption. She argues that if we accept the assumption that a new soul comes into existence each 
morning, we will similarly have to accept that a new soul comes into existence whenever our soul 
moves from one thought to another. Since this is an absurd consequence, the assumption should 
be rejected. Cockburn accepts that when I wake up in the morning my thoughts are numerically 
different from the thoughts I had yesterday, but it does not follow from this that a new soul (or a 
new person, as Locke would prefer to say,) has come into existence.61  
The question whether souls or minds perpetually thinks continues to be a topic of 
controversial debate throughout the eighteenth century.62 As we have seen Locke is committed 
to the view that all thinking is conscious and, on this basis, he regards it as likely that there are 
periods of unconsciousness, for instance during dreamless sleep. This means that for Locke it is 
highly probably that during certain periods minds or thinking substances exist without actually 
thinking. However, other philosophers, especially philosophers committed to the view that the 
mind is immaterial, are reluctant to give up the claim that the mind or soul is always thinking. 
Some accept that the mind or thinking substance must be active. Moreover, it is active in virtue 
of thinking. This means if a mind ceases to think, it ceases to be active, which for them means it 
ceases to be a mind. Philosophers who are committed to the claim that the mind always thinks, 
often offer conceptions of consciousness that differ from Locke’s understanding of 
consciousness. For instance, if contrary to Locke’s view, consciousness is identified with 
reflection, then it is possible to argue both that the mind is always thinking, including during 
periods or sleep, and that we lack consciousness of many thoughts that we have during sleep. 
The clue is that we do not reflect on all of our mental states. Another option is to argue, as 
Leibniz does, that some of our perceptions are unconscious. If many of our perceptions during 
sleep are unconscious, then there is no mystery why we are not aware of them and unable to 
remember them afterwards.  
Although Locke’s early critics offer interesting alternative concepts of selves and thinking 
substances, many of them fail to give proper credit to the novelty of Locke’s conceptual 
distinctions between persons, human beings, and substances. Locke’s early critics offer advanced 
proposals to explain how souls can perpetually think that overcome problems that concerned 
Locke. Often these proposals reject Locke’s view that all thinking is conscious. Even if Locke 
																																																						
59 This argument is a response to Second Remarks, 17. 
60 See Cockburn, Defence, 57–58. See also Gordon-Roth, "Catharine Trotter Cockburn's Defence 
of Locke," 69–70. 
61 See Cockburn, Defence, 57–58.  
62 Philosophers who engage with the debate include Anon., Vindiciae Mentis. An Essay of the Being 
and Nature of Mind (London: Printed for H. Walwyn, at the Three Legs in the Poultrey, the corner 
of Old Jury, 1702), 33–39; Leibniz, New Essays, Preface 53–56, II.i.9–19, 111–118, II.xxvii.14, 
239–240; Isaac Watts, Philosophical Essays on Various Subjects (London: Printed for Richard Ford 
and Richard Hett, 1733), Essay V, 114–131. 
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was willing to give up his view that all thinking is conscious, I believe that Locke would, 
nevertheless, insist on the importance of distinguishing the concepts of a person, human being 
and thinking substances, because for him persons are moral agents who are held accountable for 
their actions. By contrast, perpetually thinking substances, as his critics understand them, may at 
times be thinking without conscious awareness. For Locke the continued existence of a 
perpetually thinking being (in the sense of his critics) is not sufficient for moral accountability, 
because he insists that moral accountability for an action requires that a self from the inside can 
be conscious of the action in question and regards it as their own. Thus Locke’s distinction 
between persons, human beings, and thinking substances cannot be neglected as easily as some 
of his early critics did.63 
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